Being non-real-world it doesn't really fit into either NZ or SOUTH PACIFIC AVIATION sections either.
So I decided to just chuck it into this "OFF TOPIC" section
Read a few comments (the other day) in regard to things apparently being quiet "HERE" lately (similar applies to any number of other non-mainstream FS forums at the moment too). So .... thought I'd do some "stirring" .... with the intent of maybe "raising a few eye brows" .... in either surprise or disgust
.... either way I can handle it The majority of folk on this forum (the NZ'ers at least) are probably more than familiar with regard to how NZ civil aviation evolved throughout the 1960's .... particularly in relation to fleet re-equipment/aircraft types acquired and operated by both NZNAC and AIR NEW ZEALAND during this period. A few might not be aware of what could have become a reality, but didn't though, given the manner in which both political and commercial influences conspired in order to dictate what actually happened.
Most of the worlds major airlines became Jet Set members from the late 1950's. QANTAS committed to B707-138's, but Prior to this period, it was a piston-powered LOCKHEED CONSTELLATION and turbo-prop ELECTRA operator. As LOCKHEED had no pure jet project/s under development that might have resulted in it then retaining the airlines custom QANTAS was forced to consider either BOEING, De HAVILLAND, DOUGLAS, or VICKERS solutions in regard to its pure jet requirements. The COMET did not meet the airlines needs and the VC10 would not enter service until the mid 1960's .... too late to satisfy the airlines commercial intent. Although BOEING had gained considerable experience with military jet aviation, and did have a civil jet project under development, it was also regarded as a less significant producer of commercial aircraft .... lacking both the long term civil aviation experience and respect of DOUGLAS. Therefore as QANTAS began to analize its jet requirements the airline first approached DOUGLAS .... in relation to its DC-8. The airline attempted to persuade DOUGLAS to customize its DC-8 design in order to produce an aircraft capable of servicing its long trans-Pacific Ocean and trans-Indian Ocean routes around the world .... since none of the early standard DC-8 options then being marketed had sufficient range. DOUGLAS "declined" though. It was already behind the 8-ball (pun unintended) in regard to not only having to develop its DC-8 jet just to remain competitive, but also, having to relocate from Santa Monica to Long Beach to construct new facilities in order to be able to produce DC-8's .... and all at "its own expense" through having lost both the lucrative USAF KC-135A Tanker contract to BOEING, along with the associated US government development subsidy that would have paid for much of its DC-8 development costs (it can probably be fairly argued that DOUGLAS's woes, later resulting in its mid-1960's merger with McDONNELL AIRCRAFT, and eventual acquisition by BOEING during the early-1990's, all commenced around this period and were the result of this particular situation during the 1950's). Given these adverse circumstances DOUGLAS was literally in no position to be able to compromise its DC-8 design beyond the SERIES 10, -20, and -30 aircraft versions it was already committed to marketing (neither of which met QANTAS's needs though) .... accommodating any specifications beyond these standard DC-8 projects was therefore off the negotiating table. This resulted in QANTAS then approaching BOEING (its only other option) with the same proposition. BOEING, being eager to seize any opportunity to successfully market its fledgling B707, was only too pleased to accommodate the QANTAS proposition (being aided by US government/USAF KC-135A development subsidies which off-set much of its initial B707 development costs .... it was more financially able to do so). In order to meet QANTAS's requirements BOEING developed a shortened version of its B707-120 (essentially trading payload for additional range but resulting an aircraft otherwise certified in accordance with standard B707-120 weights, engine thrust, and performance .... during this period BOEING also similarly accommodated BRANIFF's request for a hot'n'high capable B707-120 which was also developed and then marketed as the B707-220). QANTAS began to take delivery of its B707-138's from July 1959. At the time it committed to these acquisitions the airline also recommended TEAL should act similarly.
NZ just had to do things differently though .... of course
.... and also act more slowly. During the mid 1950's TEAL had become a DOUGLAS customer through having inherited piston-powered DC-6's from BCPA (the airlines first land-planes), then during the late 1950's, it also acquired turbo-prop ELECTRA's too. During this period TEAL lacked need for jet equipment given both its load requirements and the type of services it operated .... although the airline was otherwise more than cognizant of its eventual need to further upgrade with jet equipment in the near future. During the early 1960's TEAL was first tempted in regard to COMET IV jets which were then being phased out of the BOAC fleet and thus enabling prompt delivery. The airline was also being enticed by CONVAIR/GENERAL DYNAMICS too .... in regard to both its CV880-M and CV990-A. Neither the COMET IV, CV880, or CV990, were suitable for TEAL's requirements though. In accordance with QANTAS' conclusion the COMET IV simply didn't have the range or payload capability to sustain the airlines projected future requirements. The CV880 was "FAST", but, it's GE turbojet engines represented "high maintenance" (as both DELTA AIR LINES and TWA quickly realized to their cost), and the CV990, although it was "FASTER STILL", its high-performance was only possible with the undesirable imposition of horrendous fuel burn and consequential range impairment (as AMERICAN AIRLINES learned to its cost) .... not to mention the payload capabilities of both aircraft being much lower than either the B707 and DC-8 too due to their smaller size and narrower fuselage cross-sections. Both QANTAS, and TEAL, were also wooed by VICKERS in regard to its VC10 and SUPER VC10 developments, but, these aircraft would not be available until well after both the B707 and DC-8 had already begun entering global airline service .... far too late for both operators. TEAL was already a turbo-prop ELECTRA operator, but again, given LOCKHEED's lack of a civil jet project, and whilst the airline had also by this time developed a comfortable relationship with DOUGLAS, it committed to the DC-8-52 during 1963 .... and which began entering service with AIR NEW ZEALAND from July 1965 (TEAL had already become AIR NZ on April 1st 1965). A similar jet war also played out between NZNAC and both the NZ and UK governments during the mid 1960's .... in regard to fleet re-equipment and prospective pure jet acquisition by NZNAC. The airline had operated British-built turbo-prop VISCOUNT's since January 1958 .... and despite NZ's then "BUY BRITISH" colonial mentality of the period it had already rejected both the turbo-prop HS748 and HP DART HERALD in favor of Dutch-built F27-100 turbo-props which began entering service with NZNAC from December 1960 .... much to the disappointment of the UK government. During early 1960's the airline was again forward planning in relation to its future fleet requirements. This time in regard to pure jet options. The UK government of the period endeavored to force NZ into buying BAC ONE-ELEVEN's and for a time the NZ government entertained this "insistence" on their behalf .... until hierarchy within NZNAC convincingly pointed out (on the basis of it having already carefully analyzed the B727-100, BAC ONE-ELEVEN, CARAVELLE, and DC-9-10) that the "then yet to be built" B737-200 was the best solution for airline. Apart from the B737's superior operating economics NZNAC particularly stressed the slat-less wing of both the BAC ONE-ELEVEN and DC-9-10 simply couldn't promote either aircraft being able to fly slowly and comfortably enough when subjected to the worst of Wellington's legendary turbulence .... whereas on the strength of known B727 performance capabilities it was accepted that the B737-200 could. This particular Jet War then became very "politically intense" .... especially when the UK government threatened to restrict NZ's trade quota, with the UK, in the event NZNAC didn't buy "British". The NZNAC defense prevailed though and the airline committed to B737-200 .... which began entering service with airline from August 1968. The "political pressure" didn't end there though. NZNAC also required a B737-200 simulator for pilot training. Its options were either the US CONDUCTRON or British REDIFUSION solutions. Another argument then erupted between the airline and NZ government of the day .... in regard to what the government would allow "its domestic airline" to acquire .... and which is alleged to as have progressed as follows ....
An NZNAC executive (a government appointee) was summoned into the NZ TRANSPORT MINISTER's office.
The NZ TRANSPORT MINISTER apparently stated .... "YOU GOT THE AEROPLANE YOU WANTED .... NOW WE'VE GOTTA DO SOMETHING FOR THE BRITISH .... SO (in regard to the simulator) YOU'LL BUY BRITISH .... AND LIKE IT"
To which the NZNAC executive is apparently reputed to have retorted .... "WE'LL BUY IT MINISTER .... BUT .... WE WON'T LIKE IT"
Based on the above historical references the following are a few textures Michael SCHNEIDER and Tony MADGE knocked up for the "now HJG hosted and represented (and updated) DMFS BAC ONE-ELEVEN and VC10/SUPER VC10 simulations for both FS2004 and FSX" .... just as a "fun reflection" upon what might have entered service with AIR NEW ZEALAND, NZNAC, QANTAS, and TEAL "had commercial, political, and other circumstantial events not conspired to dictate what actually/eventually came to pass" ....
TEAL and the VC10
AIR NEW ZEALAND and the VC10/SUPER VC10
QANTAS and the VC10/SUPER VC10
NZNAC and the BAC ONE-ELEVEN
NZNAC and the DC-9 .... "UNFINISHED TEXTURE"
Mark C
AKL/NZ
